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INTRODUCTION 
Today, trademarks infiltrate every aspect of our lives; 
companies spend huge sums of money developing and maintaining 
their trademarks.1  Every day we look for particular trademarks to 
tell us what coffee to drink, what clothes to buy, and what food to 
eat without giving thought to the trademarks’ origins.  However, 
trademarks as we know them today are the product of millennia of 
evolution.  The first trademarks, used over seven thousand years 
ago, were merely simple markings placed on pottery and animals 
to signify ownership.2  As the marketplace became more 
sophisticated, trademarks did too.  Word and image marks, which 
we take for granted today, first appeared in the Roman Empire.3  In 
the Middle Ages, the burgeoning use of trademarks in the 
marketplace finally led to the development of legislative regulation 
of trademarks.4  Trademark regulation was soon followed by the 
first instances of litigation over ownership and infringement of 
trademarks,5 heralding the beginning of trademark law as we know 
it today. 
Trademark law has continued evolving to meet the changing 
needs of society and the marketplace.  Even over the past hundred 
years, trademark law has experienced a dramatic transformation 
with the advent of trademark dilution law.6  Trademark dilution is 
distinct from traditional trademark infringement because it is not 
predicated on a likelihood of consumer confusion.7  Instead, 
dilution protects the power of trademarks to create and maintain 
 
 1 Cf. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(recognizing that companies spend millions of dollars on developing their trademarks). 
 2 FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS & TRADEMARKS 19 
(2d ed. 1993). 
 3 Id. at 20. 
 4 Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early History: Part I, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 
551, 555 (1969). 
 5 FOSTER & SHOOK, supra note 2, at 21. 
 6 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 537 U.S. 418, 429–31 (2003). 
 7 See id. at 429. 
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associations in consumers’ minds.8  Dilution comes in two types, 
blurring and tarnishment.  Blurring protects the associative power 
of a trademark from being weakened or blurred, and tarnishment 
protects the associative power of a trademark from being tainted by 
negative associations.9 
Although dilution started out as a “creature of state law,”10 
Congress later passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 
(“FTDA”) adding dilution to the Lanham Act.11  The FTDA 
provided dilution protection to a limited group of highly famous 
and distinctive marks.12  However, as with any development, the 
FTDA experienced growing pains.  These growing pains took the 
form of unfavorable and often inconsistent judicial 
interpretations.13 
In the meantime, under the FTDA, federal courts almost 
unanimously required the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s 
mark and plaintiff’s mark met a mark similarity standard before a 
claim for dilution could proceed.14  Despite this unanimity, each 
circuit employed its own mark similarity standard, ranging from 
requirements that marks be “identical or near identical” to 
“substantially or very similar.”15 
Then, in response to the hostile and inconsistent judicial 
interpretations, Congress ushered in the next era of federal dilution 
law by enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 
(“TDRA”).16  The TDRA represented an ambitious and extensive 
overhaul of federal dilution law.17  And, in its wake, courts have 
grappled with whether pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should 
continue to be applicable under the TDRA.18  On the one hand, the 
owners of famous marks, backed by the International Trademark 
 
 8 See infra notes 28–37, 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 10 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 11 Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (amended 2006). 
 12 See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 52–68, 71–84 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
 16 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
 17 See infra Part I.C. 
 18 See infra Part II.A. 
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Association, convinced some courts to discard pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.19  On the other hand, small businesses, backed 
by prominent trademark scholars, have argued against abandoning 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.20  Is disposing of pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards the next evolutionary step in federal 
dilution law?  Or is this recent development an aberrant mutation? 
This question is further complicated because courts that have 
discarded pre-TDRA mark similarity standards have reached 
different conclusions regarding the role of mark similarity in their 
absence.21  The Second Circuit, for example, refuses to allow mark 
similarity to be judged by any standard and refuses to allow mark 
similarity to be dispositive.22  The Ninth Circuit also refuses to 
allow mark similarity to be judged by any standard but, unlike the 
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit allows an abundance of mark 
similarity to be dispositive.23  The Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board, using a vastly different approach, judges mark similarity by 
a new, lower mark similarity standard and allows a lack of mark 
similarity to be dispositive.24  Accordingly, in addition to the 
uncertainty regarding whether pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards apply to the TDRA, it is also unclear what role mark 
similarity should have if pre-TDRA mark similarity standards do 
not apply. 
In deciding these two issues, courts are faced with the difficult 
task of adhering to the language of the TDRA and allowing valid 
claims of dilution by blurring to proceed, while being pressured to 
maintain the balance between free and fair competition inherent in 
trademark law. 
This Note will begin, in Part I, by highlighting the important 
formative events in the development of dilution law leading to the 
current state of the law.  Part I will then briefly discuss some of the 
policy concerns implicated by dilution and unfair competition law.  
In Part II, this Note will describe the split in opinion over whether 
 
 19 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 20 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 21 See infra Part II.B. 
 22 See infra Part II.B.1.a. 
 23 See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 24 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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pre-TDRA mark similarity standards survived the passage of the 
TDRA.  Part II will also highlight the divergent interpretations of 
the role of mark similarity in the absence of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.  In Part III, this Note will ultimately argue 
that courts should abandon pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  
In their stead, this Note contends that mark similarity should be 
judged by the new, lower mark similarity standard enunciated by 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DILUTION: FROM THE RATIONAL BASIS TO 
THE TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT 
A. The Dawn of Dilution 
Trademark law protects any word, name, symbol, or device 
used to identify and distinguish goods or services from those of 
another manufacturer or service provider.25  Traditionally, a 
trademark has been protected from uses of a junior mark26 on 
competing goods that were likely to cause consumer confusion 
regarding the source of the goods or services.  However, over the 
last century, trademark protection has expanded to include 
protection of certain marks against a junior mark on different 
grounds.27 
This protection, which has come to be labeled “dilution,” was 
initially described and advocated for by Frank Schechter in his 
seminal 1927 law review article.28  In the article, Schechter defined 
 
 25 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  The items protected by trademark law will be referred to 
collectively as “trademarks” or “marks” for the purposes of this Note. 
 26 For purposes of this Note, “junior mark” refers to the subsequent use of an 
established or senior mark.  A junior user is a subsequent user of a senior mark. See, e.g., 
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The 
first to use a mark on a product or service in a particular geographic market, the senior 
user, acquires rights in the mark in that market.  Junior users [are those] who 
subsequently use the same or similar mark on similar products or services . . . ." (citation 
omitted)). 
 27 2-5A ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5A.03 (2011) (discussing 
the history of dilution statutes and the scope of trademark protection with respect to 
dilution). 
 28 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813 (1927).  
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dilution as, “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its 
use upon non-competing goods.”29  In formulating this definition, 
Schechter observed cases, such as Wall v. Rolls-Royce,30 in which 
strict application of traditional trademark law would not have 
provided trademark owners with a remedy because the junior mark 
was being used on non-competing goods.31  However, the court 
allowed these trademark owners to recover under traditional 
trademark law despite its inapplicability.32 
Schechter posited that courts were protecting the value of a 
trademark, which he claimed derived from its selling power.33  
Selling power, according to Schechter, depended not only on the 
quality of the goods in question, but also on the power of a 
trademark to create and maintain associations in the minds of 
consumers.34  Schechter posited that this power was derived from 
the uniqueness or distinctiveness of the trademark.35  Schechter 
believed traditional trademark infringement did not adequately 
protect this alternative—but highly valuable—aspect of 
trademarks.36  Consequently, Schechter asserted that protecting 
trademarks from dilution was a necessary development in the law 
of trademarks and unfair competition.37 
Although courts continued to hand down decisions that could 
only be rationalized by Schechter’s article,38 twenty years passed 
before dilution was formally recognized as a ground for trademark 
protection by a Massachusetts statute.39  The Massachusetts 
enactment marked the beginning of statutory recognition of 
 
 29 Id. at 825. 
 30 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925). 
 31 Schechter, supra note 28, at 821–22. 
 32 See id. at 820–21. 
 33 See id. at 831. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See id. at 830–31. 
 38 See, e.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.). 
 39 See 1947 Mass. Acts, p. 300, ch. 307. 
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dilution, and at least twenty-five states have enacted statutes that 
protect against trademark dilution.40 
In addition, as dilution has evolved, it has expanded beyond 
Schechter’s initial definition into two distinct species of dilution: 
“dilution by tarnishment” and “dilution by blurring.”  Dilution by 
blurring, which is the focus of this Note, is defined by many as 
“the whittling away” of a mark’s selling power through use of 
similar, unauthorized marks.41  Common examples of dilution by 
blurring are “Kodak Pianos” and “Buick Aspirin.”42  Dilution by 
tarnishment provides a different type of protection and is generally 
defined as an association between a junior and senior mark that 
portrays the senior mark in a negative context.43  A famous 
example of dilution by tarnishment is a magazine’s portrayal of the 
Pillsbury Dough Boy in a pornographic manner.44 
B. Dilution Climbs from the State Law Ooze: The Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act 
For many years, dilution protection varied on a state-by-state 
basis.45  Many saw this patchwork protection as inadequate due to 
the lack of standardization and the reluctance of courts to grant 
nationwide injunctions under state law.46  Then, in 1995, these 
concerns compelled Congress to pass the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”).47  The FTDA defined dilution as 
the “lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services.”48  The FTDA also made clear that, 
unlike traditional trademark infringement, protection against 
dilution was available regardless of whether the marks were used 
 
 40 Ringling-Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 41 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).  
 42 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1030. 
 43 See, e.g., Deer & Co., 41 F.3d at 43. 
 44 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
 45 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3–4. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (amended 2006). 
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on competing products or whether the junior mark created a 
likelihood of consumer confusion.49 
The FTDA also provided: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, 
subject to the principles of equity and upon such 
terms as the court deems reasonable, to an 
injunction against another person’s commercial use 
in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use 
begins after the mark has become famous and 
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided 
in this subsection.50 
This language was interpreted to require a plaintiff to establish 
the following five elements in order to receive injunctive relief: (1) 
the senior mark must be famous; (2) the senior mark must be 
distinctive; (3) the junior mark must be used commercially; (4) the 
junior mark must have begun to be used after the senior mark 
became famous; and (5) the junior mark’s use must “cause dilution 
of the distinctive quality of the senior mark.”51 
Although the FTDA provided a list of factors for courts to use 
when determining whether marks were “famous,” no other 
guidance was provided to aid courts in determining whether the 
elements were met.52  This led to substantial disagreement over the 
interpretation and application of these elements.  For example, the 
FTDA simply required distinctiveness and did not explicitly 
indicate whether inherent or acquired distinctiveness could satisfy 
the distinctiveness requirement.53  Consequently, some courts 
limited dilution protection to inherently distinctive marks,54 while 
other courts allowed marks that had inherent or acquired 
 
 49 Id.  
 50 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006). 
 51 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (Leval, 
J.).  Alternatively, some courts only employed four factors by considering the fame and 
distinctiveness elements as one element. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 
F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 53 See id. § 1125(c)(1). 
 54 See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Comms., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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distinctiveness to qualify for dilution protection.55  Despite the 
guidance on how to determine whether fame existed, the fame 
element was also the subject of disagreement because the FTDA 
did not explicitly define what constituted sufficient fame to justify 
dilution protection.56  Accordingly, some courts allowed the fame 
element to be satisfied by proof of fame in a specialized or niche 
market,57 while other courts rejected the niche market theory and 
required proof of fame among the general public.58 
The fifth element, which required that the junior mark “cause 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark,” was similarly 
subject to inconsistent interpretations.  For one, although all courts 
agreed that this language allowed for claims of dilution by 
blurring, courts questioned whether this language allowed for 
claims of dilution by tarnishment.59  Courts also disagreed over 
whether the “cause dilution” element required proof of “actual 
dilution” or “a likelihood of dilution.”  On the one hand, the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuit interpreted “cause dilution” to require proof of 
“actual dilution.”60  In these circuits, plaintiffs were required to 
show proof that they had suffered actual harm.  On the other hand, 
the First, Second, Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits interpreted 
“cause dilution” to require proof of a “likelihood of dilution.”61  In 
these circuits, the possibility of harm was sufficient to support a 
claim of dilution. 
 
 55 See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, LLC, 212 F.3d 
157, 163 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 56 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 57 See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 164; Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek 
Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car, 238 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 58 See, e.g., TCPIP Holding, 244 F.3d at 99. 
 59 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 452 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 60 See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670–71  (5th Cir. 
2000); Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d 449 at 461. 
 61 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 474–76 (6th Cir. 2001), 
rev’d, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466–
68 (7th Cir. 2000); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d 157, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 220, 224–25 (2d Cir. 1999); I.P. Lund 
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47–50 (1st Cir. 1998). 
C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  4:49 PM 
302 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:291 
The FTDA also failed to provide courts with any guidance on 
how to prove whether a junior mark “caused dilution.”62  For this 
reason, some courts relied on their prior experience crafting the 
likelihood of confusion standard to create non-exhaustive lists of 
relevant factors for courts to consider when making this 
determination.63  The Second Circuit, the champion of this 
approach, developed a list of ten relevant factors.64 
Although some circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s list of 
factors,65 other circuits later criticized the Second Circuit’s list for 
including irrelevant factors and adopted different lists of factors.66  
In particular, the Seventh Circuit significantly truncated the 
Second Circuit’s list of factors.67  In fact, the Seventh Circuit only 
considered two factors—the fame of the senior mark and the 
similarity between the marks—when determining whether dilution 
existed.68 
Despite disagreement over which factors were relevant and 
whether to use factors at all, similarity between marks was part of 
the dilution analysis in every circuit.69  And, in most circuits, the 
marks at issue were required to reach a minimum standard before a 
 
 62 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006). 
 63 See, e.g., Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216–17.    
 64 Id. at 217–223.  The Second Circuit determined that the following ten factors were 
relevant: 
(a) Distinctiveness. 
(b) Similarity of the marks. 
(c) Proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap. 
(d) Interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the 
similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products. 
(e) Shared consumers and geographic limitations. 
(f) Sophistication of consumers. 
(g) Actual confusion. 
(h) Adjectival or referential quality of the junior use. 
(i) Harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user. 
(j) Effect of the senior’s prior laxity in protecting the mark. 
Id. 
 65 See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 168–69. 
 66 See, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 803–05 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 67 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 68 See id. at 469. 
 69 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(5)(c)(i) (2011). 
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claim for dilution could proceed.70  For the purposes of this Note, 
these standards are referred to as mark similarity standards. 
Courts formulated their mark similarity standards in 
substantially different ways.  In particular, the Fourth Circuit 
required “sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks 
to invoke an ‘instinctive mental association’ of the two [marks] by 
a relevant universe of consumers.”71  The Second Circuit seemed 
to adopt the Fourth Circuit’s standard when it required “sufficient 
similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will 
conjure an association with the senior.”72  However, the Second 
Circuit’s mark similarity standard was repeatedly restated as 
requiring marks to be “very” or “substantially” similar.73 
The First and Eighth Circuits required marks to be “similar 
enough that a significant segment of . . . customers sees the two 
marks as essentially the same.”74  The Ninth Circuit, following the 
Eighth Circuit, required marks to be “identical or nearly 
identical.”75  Additionally, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 
seemingly conflating the above standards, required marks to be 
“identical or ‘very or substantially similar.’”76  The Board 
continued by holding the mark similarity standard for dilution was 
the Eighth Circuit’s standard: whether consumers would see the 
two marks as “essentially the same.”77 
In addition to formulating their mark similarity standards 
differently, courts justified their mark similarity standards in 
different ways.  Some courts applied mark similarity standards as 
 
 70 See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
 71 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 72 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 73 See, e.g., Playtex Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 390 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 176 (2d 
Cir. 2000)) (restating “sufficient similarity” as “very or substantially similar”). 
 74 Luigino’s Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999); see also I.P. 
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 75 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Luigino’s 
Inc., 170 F.3d at 832). 
 76 Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1183 (T.T.A.B. 2001). 
 77 Id. 
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part of their dilution analysis.78  These courts generally relied on 
dilution theory and prior interpretations of state dilution law.79  On 
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit justified its mark similarity 
standard by looking at the language, legislative history, and 
purpose of the FTDA.80 
Recognizing the disagreement among many of the circuit 
courts, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court attempted to settle one of the conflicts discussed 
above.81  In particular, the Court decided to resolve the conflict 
over whether the “causes dilution” language in the FTDA required 
proof of “actual dilution” or “likelihood of dilution” in order to 
bring some clarity to the FTDA.82  The Court determined the 
“cause dilution” language required proof of “actual dilution.”83  
Along the way, the Court questioned whether dilution could occur 
when the marks at issue were not identical, seemingly providing 
support for the mark similarity standards discussed above.84  
However, the Court’s decision was not long-lived.85 
C. Bringing Dilution Back from the Brink: The Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act 
According to some, the Court’s “actual dilution” requirement 
in Moseley effectively eradicated federal dilution law as an 
effective tool.86  In their opinion, the “actual dilution” requirement 
meant prospective plaintiffs would have to wait until dilution had 
already significantly and irreparably harmed the famous mark.87  
Congress was persuaded by this reasoning and quickly overruled 
the Court’s holding in Moseley through the Trademark Dilution 
 
 78 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 79 See, e.g., id. 
 80 See Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 81 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 82 Id. at 421–22. 
 83 Id. at 433. 
 84 See id. at 432. 
 85 See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 86 See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, 
International Trademark Association). 
 87 Id. 
C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  4:49 PM 
2012] EVOLUTION OR MUTATION? 305 
Revision Act of 2006.88  In the TDRA, Congress clarified that 
federal dilution law only requires proof of “likelihood of 
dilution.”89 
Although the TDRA still requires proof of five elements, 
Congress substantially altered these elements to clarify dilution 
law and settle many of the circuit splits that emerged under the 
FTDA.90  Under the TDRA, a plaintiff bringing a dilution claim 
needs to prove: (1) its mark is famous among the general 
consuming public; (2) its mark is distinctive, inherently or through 
acquired distinctiveness; (3) the junior mark began to be used after 
the famous mark became famous; (4) the junior mark is being used 
in commerce; (5) the junior mark is likely to cause dilution of the 
famous mark.91 
In addition to clarifying that “actual dilution” is not required, 
these new elements make clear that niche fame is insufficient to 
support a claim for dilution.92  It also provides that marks with 
acquired distinctiveness can qualify for dilution protection, and 
that federal dilution law protects against both blurring and 
tarnishment.93  Moreover, in an effort to better assist courts in 
determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous, the TDRA 
amended the list of factors contained in the FTDA for courts to 
consider when analyzing whether a mark is sufficiently famous.94 
The TDRA also provides guidance to courts applying the fifth 
element by explicitly defining dilution by blurring and providing a 
list of factors courts can consider when determining whether this 
definition has been met.95  Specifically, the TDRA defines dilution 
by blurring as an “association arising from the similarity between a 
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
 
 88 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
 89 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
 90 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
 91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
 92 See Barton Beebe, Symposium: A Defense of the New Federal Trademark 
Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1157–58 (2006).  
 93 See id. at 1159–61, 1172–74. 
 94 See id. at 1158–59. 
 95 See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
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distinctiveness of the famous mark.”96  And, the non-exhaustive 
list of factors a court can consider to determine whether there is a 
likelihood of dilution by blurring is as follows: 
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or 
trade name and the famous mark. 
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness of the famous mark. 
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous 
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of 
the mark. 
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. 
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name 
intended to create an association with the famous 
mark. 
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or 
trade name and the famous mark.97 
D. Is Dilution an Invasive Species? Concerns About Dilution’s 
Justification and Anti-Competitive Effects 
During the course of dilution’s evolution, courts and scholars 
have remained skeptical of dilution protection.  In particular, 
courts and commentators have characterized dilution as a “limited 
remedy” and have warned about the dangers of expansive dilution 
protection.98  At its core, this skepticism can be traced to concerns 
about the policy groundings of federal dilution law.99  For instance, 
traditional trademark protection focuses on protecting consumers 
and protecting trademark owners from unfair practices.100  In 
 
 96 See id.  The TDRA also defines dilution by tarnishment as an “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the 
reputation of the famous mark.” See id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 97 Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
 98 See, e.g., 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(1). 
 99 See, e.g., Paul Alan Levy, Symposium: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—A 
Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189, 1192–94 
(2006). 
 100 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (citing Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)). 
C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  4:49 PM 
2012] EVOLUTION OR MUTATION? 307 
contrast, dilution protection is not justified by protecting 
consumers.101 
However, although some scholars tout consumer protection as 
the sole function of trademark law,102 trademark law is also aimed 
at protecting the trademark owner and prohibiting unfair 
competition.103  In fact, trademark law is doctrinally located within 
the broader law of unfair competition.104  Unfair competition is 
premised on the balancing of free competition and fair 
competition.105  The doctrine of free competition logically provides 
businesses with a right to attract customers from other 
businesses.106  On the other hand, fair competition recognizes there 
are certain business practices a business could use to attract 
customers which, nevertheless, should be prohibited for the benefit 
of the public and for the sake of fairness.107 
Regardless, courts and scholars remain worried about the 
dangers of expansive dilution.108  According to some scholars and 
courts, expansive dilution protection is tantamount to granting 
rights “in gross” to trademark owners.109  A trademark right “in 
gross” is defined as a right that does not grow out of the 
commercial use of the trademark.110  Trademark law is generally 
regarded as having a presumption against granting trademark rights 
“in gross” in part because they impair free competition.111  This 
presumption has been used to justify limiting dilution protection.112 
 
 101 Id. at 429. 
 102 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 99, at 1192–93. 
 103 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428 (citing Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64). 
 104 See id. 
 105 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25. 
 106 See id. § 25 cmt. a. 
 107 See id. § 25 cmt. g. 
 108 See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 109 See, e.g., id. at 875 (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
& UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:108 (Supp. 1998)). 
 110 See United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918). 
 111 See id. 
 112 See, e.g., Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875. 
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II. EVOLVING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS: ARE PRE-TDRA MARK 
SIMILARITY STANDARDS STILL APPLICABLE UNDER THE TDRA 
AND, IF NOT, WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE OF MARK SIMILARITY? 
Prior to the enactment of the TDRA, courts required famous 
marks to meet high mark similarity standards before a claim for 
dilution by burring could proceed.113  However, after enactment of 
the TDRA, the owners of famous marks and the International 
Trademark Association persuaded the Second and Ninth Circuits to 
discard their pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.114  While no 
other circuit court has addressed the issue, some district courts 
have determined that pre-TDRA mark similarity standards are still 
applicable.115  Additionally, small businesses and prominent 
trademark scholars argue for the continued use of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.116  Accordingly, there is significant 
uncertainty regarding whether courts should continue to use pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards as part of the dilution by blurring 
analysis. 
Adding to the uncertainty, in the absence of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards, courts have reached inconsistent results 
regarding the role of mark similarity in the dilution by blurring 
analysis.  On the one hand, the Second and Ninth Circuits employ 
mildly different approaches that minimize the role of mark 
similarity.117  On the other hand, the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board employs a vastly different approach to the role of mark 
 
 113 See supra notes 69–77and accompanying text. 
 114 See infra Part II.A.1.a–b. 
 115 See 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27 § 5A.01(5)(c)(i) (2011) (noting no other circuit 
courts have addressed this issue); see also Council on American-Islamic Rels. Action 
Network, Inc. v. Schlussel, No. 11-10061, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89199, at *16–17 
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2011) (applying pre-TDRA mark similarity standard); V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 744–45 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (applying pre-
TDRA mark similarity standard).  Other lower courts have interpreted the TDRA 
consistently with the Second and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. 
Teachbook.Com LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764, 780–81 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (questioning the 
continued use of mark similarity standards); Cottonwood Fin. Ltd. v. Cash Stores Fin. 
Servs., 778 F. Supp. 2d 726, 750 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (interpreting Texas dilution law, 
which is the same as federal dilution law, to abandon the use of mark similarity 
standards). 
 116 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 117 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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similarity that gives mark similarity a central role in the blurring 
analysis.118  Consequently, not only is the applicability of pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards in question, but, more generally, 
the proper role of mark similarity is also unsettled. 
This section details the preceding conflict regarding pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards and the proper role of mark similarity.  It 
first presents the reasons given by the Second and Ninth Circuits 
for abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards and then 
discusses other arguments made by owners of famous marks and 
the International Trademark Association advocating for 
abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  Next, it sets 
forth the arguments made by small businesses and prominent 
trademark scholars supporting continuing to use pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards in the dilution by blurring analysis. 
Subsequently, this section analyzes the inconsistent treatment 
of mark similarity among courts that have abandoned pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards.  It begins by outlining the approach of 
the Second and Ninth Circuits, which, while similar, have 
substantial differences.  It concludes by exploring the vastly 
different approach used by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. 
A. Are Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Appropriately 
Employed After the Revisions Made by the TDRA? 
In the wake of the revisions made by the TDRA, courts and 
commentators have disagreed over the continued applicability of 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  On the one hand, the Second 
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the International Trademark 
Association support discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards.  On the other hand, prominent trademark scholars and 
small businesses support continuing to apply pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.  This section details the arguments made by 
these groups in turn. 
 
 118 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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1. The Case for Discarding Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity 
Standards 
There are a variety of arguments for discarding pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards in light of the revisions made by the 
TDRA.  Some of these arguments have been articulated and 
adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits when these circuits 
discarded their respective pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  
Still the International Trademark Association has made other 
arguments in favor of discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards. 
a) The Second Circuit’s Reasons for Discarding Pre-
TDRA Mark Similarity Standards 
In Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., the Second 
Circuit surprisingly held that its pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standard requiring marks to be “very” or “substantially similar” 
should not be employed under the TDRA.119  In Starbucks Corp., 
Starbucks, a ubiquitous company known for coffee products, 
brought suit in the Southern District of New York against Black 
Bear, a small company also in the business of selling coffee 
products, for using CHARBUCKS BLEND and MISTER 
CHARBUCKS.120  Starbucks alleged Black Bear’s use of these 
marks constituted trademark dilution of the “Starbucks Marks” 
under the FTDA 121  After a two-day bench trial, the district court 
dismissed Starbucks’ dilution claim under the FTDA because 
Starbucks had not proven actual dilution.122 
Starbucks appealed, but before the appeal was heard Congress 
passed the TDRA, which replaced the “actual dilution” 
requirement with a “likelihood of dilution” requirement.123  
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings.124  Again, the district court ruled in favor of Black 
 
 119 588 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that the District Court erred to the 
extent it required ‘substantial’ similarity between the marks. . . .”). 
 120 See id. at 103. 
 121 See id. at 102–03. 
 122 See id. at 104. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
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Bear.125  In its analysis, the district court applied the Second 
Circuit’s pre-TDRA mark similarity standard and determined the 
marks were not “substantially” similar.126  As a result, the district 
court found “[t]his dissimilarity alone is sufficient to defeat 
[Starbucks’] blurring claim, and in any event, this factor at a 
minimum weighs strongly against [Starbucks] in the dilution 
analysis.”127  On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded the district 
court had improperly required the marks to be “substantially 
similar” as part of its dilution by blurring analysis.128 
Before turning to the language of the TDRA, the Second 
Circuit analyzed its reasons, or lack thereof, for adopting its 
“substantial similarity” standard under the FTDA.129  The court 
found it had not based its pre-TDRA mark similarity on the FTDA, 
which did not provide courts with a definition of dilution and, also, 
did not provide courts with guidance on how to weigh similarity 
when analyzing dilution.130  Instead, the Second Circuit reasoned 
its “substantial similarity” standard was attributable to reliance on 
prior interpretations of state dilution statutes because the state 
statutes were better defined.131  For this reason, the Second Circuit 
found its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard not properly justified 
under the FTDA.132 
Then, turning to the language of the TDRA, the Second Circuit 
noted the language of the TDRA compelled abandonment of its 
“substantial similarity” standard.133  In particular, the Second 
Circuit focused on the following statutory language134: 
“dilution by blurring” is association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
 
 125 Id. at 104–05. 
 126 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 127 Id.  
 128 Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109. 
 129 See id. at 107–08.   
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 108. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id.  
 134 See id. 
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famous mark.  In determining whether a mark or 
trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, 
the court may consider all relevant factors, 
including the following: 
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or 
trade name and the famous mark. 
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness of the famous mark. 
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous 
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of 
the mark. 
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. 
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name 
intended to create an association with the famous 
mark. 
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or 
trade name and the famous mark.135 
 
According to the Second Circuit, the absence of the terms 
“very” or “substantial” from this statutory language meant the 
“substantially similar” standard should be abandoned.136  
Moreover, the Second Circuit noted the TDRA specifically 
instructs courts to weigh the “degree of similarity.”137  The Second 
Circuit stated this mandate was inconsistent with requiring 
“substantial” similarity to support a successful dilution claim.138 
The Second Circuit further supported its position by pointing 
out that employing pre-TDRA mark similarity standards would 
improperly minimize the importance of the other factors.139  To 
enumerate, “degree of similarity” is one of six non-exhaustive 
factors.140  And, according to the court, embracing the “substantial 
similarity” standard would marginalize the other five factors unless 
 
 135 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
 136 Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 108. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
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there were substantial similarity.141  The court found this to be 
improper because it violated a bedrock principle of statutory 
interpretation, that every piece of a statute should have meaning.142  
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the statutory text provided 
strong evidence that courts should not employ the “substantial 
similarity” standard.143 
b) The Ninth Circuit’s Reasons for Discarding its Pre-
TDRA Mark Similarity Standard 
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., the 
Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s lead when it held its 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standard, which required marks to be 
“identical” or “nearly identical,” should no longer be employed.144  
In Levi Strauss & Co., Levi Strauss, a clothing manufacturer and 
retailer, sued Abercrombie, another clothing manufacturer and 
retailer, for trademark dilution in violation of the TDRA.145  The 
marks at issue in this case were patterns located on the back pocket 
of each company’s blue jeans.146  Levi Strauss’s mark, named 
“Arcuate” consisted of “two connecting arches that meet in the 
center of the [back] pocket.”147  Abercrombie’s mark, named 
“Ruehl . . . consist[ed] of two less-pronounced arches that are 
connected by a ‘dipsy doodle,’ which resembles the mathematical 
sign for infinity.”148 
During a bench trial with advisory rulings from the jury, the 
jury was asked: “Is Abercrombie’s Ruehl design identical or nearly 
identical to the Arcuate trademark?”149  The advisory jury 
responded that the marks were not identical or nearly identical.150  
 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. (citing United States v. Kozeny, 541 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir.  2008)). 
 143 See id. at 109. 
 144 633 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. See infra Figure A. 
 148 Id. See infra Figure B. 
 149 Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150 Id. 
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The advisory jury also found Abercrombie’s design was not likely 
to dilute Levi Strauss’s mark.151 
After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Abercrombie on 
Levi Strauss’s federal dilution claim.152  The district court noted 
that Levi Strauss did not prove Abercrombie was “making 
commercial use of a mark that is identical or nearly identical to the 
Arcuate mark.”153  The district court also found that, since the 
marks were not identical or nearly identical and Levi Strauss did 
not produce “persuasive evidence of actual association,” both the 
similarity and actual association factors weighed in favor of 
Abercrombie.154  In addition, the district court reasoned, “even if 
the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the Arcuate 
mark and the degree of recognition of the mark weigh in [Levi 
Strauss]’s favor, the Court finds that those factors do not outweigh 
the factors that weigh in [Abercrombie]’s favor.”155  Consequently, 
the district court agreed with the advisory jury’s determination that 
Abercrombie’s “Ruehl” mark was not likely to cause dilution by 
blurring of Levi Strauss’s “Arcuate” mark.156  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit held requiring marks to be “identical, nearly identical or 
substantially similar” was improper.157 
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion, like the Second Circuit, 
by tracing the origin of its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard.158  
The Ninth Circuit traced the support for its initial adoption of the 
“identical or nearly identical” standard to a case interpreting the 
New York dilution statute.159  The Ninth Circuit also found it had 
later determined the “identical or nearly identical” standard was 
supported by the language, legislative history, and purpose of the 
 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., No. C 07-03752 (JSW), 
2009 WL 1082175, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. 
 157 Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1172. 
 158 See id. at 1162–65. 
 159 See id. at 1163–64 (“[T]he requirement of identity, or substantial similarity, pre-
dates the adoption of the FTDA in 1996, and has its origins in state dilution law, 
specifically that of the State of New York.”). 
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FTDA in Thane International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp.160  
Particularly, Thane focused on the language in the FTDA stating a 
junior user “must use ‘a mark or trade name . . . after the mark has 
become famous.’”161  This language, according to Thane, 
necessitated use of “essentially the same mark, not just a similar 
one” to satisfy a federal dilution claim.162  Thane found this 
reasoning was supported because the only examples of dilution 
from the legislative history involved use of the identical mark.163  
Thane also supported its reading of the FTDA’s text by describing 
dilution as a form of appropriation that “implied [dilution requires] 
the adoption of the mark itself.”164  Therefore, unlike the Second 
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit justified its pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standard in the text of the FTDA. 
Regardless, reaching the issue before the court, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the “identical” or “nearly identical” standard was 
no longer applicable under the TDRA.165  The Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning was similar to the Second Circuit’s reasoning.  However, 
the Ninth Circuit also reasoned that its holding was supported by 
Congress’s extensive overhaul of the FTDA.166  According to the 
court, this extensive overhaul showed Congress did not intend to 
be bound by prior interpretations of the FTDA, including the 
interpretations that led to the use of pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards.167 
c) Other Arguments for Discarding Pre-TDRA Mark 
Similarity Standards 
The owners of famous trademarks and the International 
Trademark Association have advanced other arguments for 
discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  One argument is 
that pre-TDRA mark similarity standards lacked justification and, 
 
 160 Id. at 1164 (discussing Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 161 Id. at 1164 (quoting Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 905). 
 162 Id. (quoting Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 905) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163 See id. at 1164–65 (citing Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 906). 
 164 See id. at 1165 (quoting Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 906). 
 165 Id. at 1172. 
 166 See id. 
 167 See id.  
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as a result, should not continue to be employed.168  The Second 
Circuit admitted its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard was 
improperly justified because it relied solely on interpretation of a 
state law.169  Most pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were 
justified in the same way the Second Circuit justified its 
standard.170  Accordingly, pre-TDRA standards are criticized 
because they relied on interpretation of a state dilution statute with 
no justification for extending the rule to federal dilution law.171 
Although neither the Second nor the Ninth Circuit considered 
the legislative history of the TDRA (each circuit held its text was 
unambiguous),172 the owners of famous marks and the 
International Trademark Association have argued the legislative 
history supports discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards.173  In fact, during a hearing on the TDRA, then-
President of the INTA, Anne Gundelfinger, testified that under the 
TDRA, “[t]he less similar the marks, the less likely a consumer 
association between the marks, the more similar the marks, or if 
they are identical, the more likely it is that the junior mark will 
impair the association of the senior mark with its source and/or its 
particular brand attributes.”174  Consequently, it is argued that this 
statement, in connection with other references to merely similar 
marks qualifying for dilution protection, shows that the legislative 
history supports eliminating pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards.175 
 
 168 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 18–19, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-16322).  
 169 See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 170 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Brief of Appellant at 25, Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d 1158 (No. 09-16322). 
 172 See Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1172 n.10; Starbucks Corp v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, 
Inc. 588 F.3d 97, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 173 Brief of Amicus Curiae International Trademark Association In Support of Vacatur 
and Remand at 21–22, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 
1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-16322). 
 174 Id. at 22 (quoting Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, 
International Trademark Association)). 
 175 See id. 
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2. The Case for Continuing to Employ Pre-TDRA Mark 
Similarity Standards 
Although district courts have upheld the continued use of pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards in the dilution by blurring 
analysis,176 the Second and Ninth Circuits are the only circuit 
courts to address the continued applicability of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.177  Additionally, some district courts that have 
continued to apply pre-TDRA mark similarity standards did not 
thoroughly analyze the issue.178  Regardless, the case for continued 
use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards has developed through 
the decisions of district courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board.179  Furthermore, small business and prominent trademark 
scholars have argued for continued use of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.180  In general, these arguments can be 
organized into arguments based on the statutory text of the TDRA, 
arguments based on the legislative history of the TDRA, arguments 
based on generalizations of dilution as a theory of harm, and 
arguments based on concern for the anti-competitive effects of 
expansive dilution protection. 
a)  The Textual Argument for Continued Use of Pre-
TDRA Mark Similarity Standards 
The argument based on the statutory text focuses on the 
TDRA’s definition of dilution by blurring as “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and the famous 
mark . . . .”181 According to one district court, this language 
 
 176 See Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Schlussel, No. 11-
10061, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89199, at *16–17 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2011); V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 744–45 (W.D. Ky. 2008), aff’d 605 
F.3d 382 (6th Cir 2010); Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Grp., No. CIV 03-
0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at *43 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007). 
 177 See 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(5)(c)(i). 
 178 See Schlussel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89199, at *16–17; V Secret Catalogue, 558 F. 
Supp. 2d at 744–45.  But see Century 21 Real Estate, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at 
*43–44 (providing explicit discussion of the issue and its reasons for adhering to pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards).  
 179 See infra Part II.A.2.a–d. 
 180 See infra Part II.A.2.a–d. 
 181 Century 21 Real Estate LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at *43 (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)). 
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indicates Congress’ intent to allow for the continued use of pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards.182  In his prominent treatise, 
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy expands on this argument.183  
Professor McCarthy reasons that this language presupposes that a 
mark must meet a given level of similarity before dilution can 
occur.184  As a result, it is contended that the text of the blurring 
definition supports continuing to employ pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards. 
Although the statute also contains a list of relevant factors—
which includes “degree of similarity”—some parties still assert 
that the text of the TDRA supports continuing to apply pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards.  For example, since courts are charged 
with interpreting a statute’s sections consistently, some argue that 
courts must interpret “degree of similarity” and the list of relevant 
factors in light of the dilution by blurring definition.185  It is 
insisted that reading “degree of similarity” and the list of relevant 
factors to prohibit pre-TDRA mark similarity standards violates 
this principle of statutory interpretation.186  For these reasons, 
small businesses and prominent trademark scholars argue that 
proper interpretation of the TDRA allows for the continued use of 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. 
b)   Arguments Relying on Legislative History to Show 
Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Are Still 
Appropriate 
Although the legislative history is relatively sparse, small 
business and prominent trademark scholars find support for their 
position in the legislative history.  For instance, despite the lengthy 
discussion of the intended changes made by the TDRA, the 
legislative history contains no discussion of an intention to alter the 
 
 182 See id. 
 183 4 THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
24:117 (4th ed. 2011). 
 184 See id.  
 185 See, e.g., Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 19–20, Levi Strauss & Co. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-16322). 
 186 See id.  
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mark similarity standards used by almost all circuits.187  
Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that, during 
consideration of the TDRA, a Republican congressman stated 
federal dilution law “should be narrowly crafted . . . to protect only 
the most famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the 
distinctiveness of the mark.”188  This language arguably implies 
that dilution protection is limited to uses of the famous mark, not 
merely similar marks.189  Accordingly, because the legislative 
history did not indicate whether congress intended to eliminate the 
widespread use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, and 
because the legislative history characterized dilution as applying to 
identical marks, some insist that pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards are appropriately employed under the TDRA.190 
c)   Arguments that Dilution as a Theory of Harm Supports 
Continuing to Apply Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity 
Standards 
Another argument is that dilution, as a theory of harm, requires 
use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  For support, this 
argument points to Schechter’s initial articulation of dilution.191  In 
particular, since Schechter characterized dilution as the “gradual 
whittling away . . . of the identity and hold upon the public mind of 
the mark,” it is argued that dilution only applies to highly similar 
or identical marks.192  Consistent with this proposition, Professor 
McCarthy has similarly characterized dilution under federal law as 
“one mark seen by customers as now identifying two sources.”193  
According to Professor McCarthy, this concept of the harm caused 
by dilution requires marks to be at least nearly identical.194 
 
 187 See id. at 28; see also Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Grp., No. CIV 
03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at *43 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007) (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 8, 25 (2005)). 
 188 Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 27, Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d 1158 (No. 09-
16322) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 25). 
 189 See id. at 28. 
 190 See id. at 29. 
 191 See id. at 30. 
 192 See id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 28, at 825). 
 193 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 183. 
 194 See id. 
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Small businesses and prominent trademark scholars further 
contend that federal courts have similarly characterized dilution in 
this manner.  The Ninth Circuit, for instance, characterized dilution 
under the FTDA as a form of appropriation.195  And, according to 
the Ninth Circuit, this meant the FTDA required use of identical or 
nearly identical marks.196  Moreover, courts have described federal 
dilution law as a limited remedy.197  For these reasons, some 
contend that dilution as a theory of harm requires courts to employ 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. 
d) Arguments that Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards 
Are Required to Prevent Federal Dilution Law from 
Having Anti-Competitive Effects 
The final category of argument supporting the continued use of 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standard contends that these standards 
are required to protect free and fair competition.  Within this 
category, the primary argument is that failing to use pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards would grant famous marks trademark 
rights in gross.  Professor McCarthy has aptly summarized this 
argument by stating: 
[N]o antidilution law should be so interpreted and 
applied as to result in granting the owner of a 
famous mark the automatic right to exclude any and 
all uses of similar marks in all product or service 
lines.  Such a radical expansion of trademark 
exclusionary rights would upset the delicate balance 
between free competition and fair competition.  
Rejection of such an expansion is consistent with 
the fundamental principles and purposes of 
trademark protection.  The balance between fair 
competition and free competition must always be 
maintained and kept fine-tuned for the economy to 
 
 195 Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 196 See id. 
 197 See, e.g., AutoZone v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 805–06 (citing Jet, Inc. v. 
Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
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work at a reasonable rate of efficiency and 
competitiveness.198 
This concern has been embraced by courts that recognize “the 
implications of a broad application of the federal antidilution 
statute are troubling, as dilution causes of action, much more so 
than infringement and unfair competition laws, tread very close to 
granting rights in gross in a trademark.”199  A recent student Note 
provides concrete examples of the consequences of failing to use 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.200  Specifically, the Note 
asserts that without pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, “Federal 
Express” becomes a prohibition against the use of “Federal Press,” 
“Federal Impress” and “Federal Empress,” along with many other 
variations of “Federal Express.”201 
Another student Note has recently provided a different concern 
regarding the anti-competitive effects of failing to employ pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards.202  In particular, the Note 
focused on the special problem posed by dilution protection of 
marks used on products in competition.203  For instance, consider a 
creative industry where marks serve more than just a source 
designation purpose, like the fashion industry.  Creative industries 
such as this are built on a culture of borrowing.204  In these 
industries, the Note argues, expansive dilution protection will have 
tremendous anti-competitive effects.205  The Note enumerates that 
 
 198 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 183, § 24:67 (4th ed. 2011); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. b (1995) (noting that “courts continue to 
confine the cause of action for dilution to cases in which the protectable interest is clear 
and the threat of interference is substantial”). 
 199 Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 200 Chris Brown, Note, A Dilution Delusion: The Unjustifiable Protection of Similar 
Marks, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1039–40 (2004). 
 201 See id. 
 202 See Brandy G. Barrett, Recent Development, Contrasting Levi v. Abercrombie with 
Louboutin v. Yves St. Laurent: Revealing Appropriate Trademark Boundaries in the 
Fashion World, 13 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 20–21 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/files/Barrett_1_34.pdf. 
 203 See id. 
 204 See id.  
 205 See id. 
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dilution protection of dissimilar or minimally similar marks would 
grant companies with household names monopolies on the creative 
output of the industry and, therefore, would allow them to halt the 
progress of the industry.206  Accordingly, it is argued that courts 
should continue to employ pre-TDRA mark similarity standards 
because of the potential anti-competitive effects. 
B. Evolutionary Uncertainty: Examining the Inconsistent 
Treatment of Mark Similarity in the Absence of Pre-TDRA 
Mark Similarity Standards 
Even though many courts agree pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards should be discarded, these courts treat mark similarity 
different in the absence of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  
The Second and Ninth Circuits have employed similar, yet 
different approaches minimizing the role of mark similarity under 
the TDRA and refusing to employ any mark similarity standard.  In 
contrast, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s approach 
employs a relaxed mark similarity standard.  This section details 
the approaches of these courts in turn. 
1. The Similar Approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuit 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have employed similar 
treatments of mark similarity since discarding their pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards.  However, there are small differences.  
The Second circuit minimized the importance of mark similarity 
and refused to employ a mark similarity standard.  The Ninth 
Circuit differs from this approach slightly because it recognizes 
mark similarity as a special, possibly necessary, but not dispositive 
factor.  Nevertheless, the Second and Ninth Circuit treat mark 
similarity in much the same way. 
a)  The Second Circuit 
As discussed above, in Starbucks, the Second Circuit held its 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standard should no longer be 
employed.207  Instead, the court noted “the existence of some—but 
 
 206 See id. 
 207 See supra Part II.A.1.a.  
C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  4:49 PM 
2012] EVOLUTION OR MUTATION? 323 
not substantial—similarity between the marks may be sufficient in 
some cases to demonstrate a likelihood of dilution by blurring.”208  
Then, the court recognized “similarity is an integral element in the 
definition of blurring.”209  However, the court instructed “degree of 
similarity” should be weighed without reference to a mark 
similarity standard and should not be treated differently than the 
other relevant factors listed in the TDRA.210  According to the 
court, the proper approach to determining whether dilution by 
blurring exists is to equally weigh “degree of similarity” with the 
remaining factors, focusing on “whether an association, arising 
from the similarity between the subject marks, ‘impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark.’”211 
On remand, the district court’s application of the Second 
Circuit’s methodology may give insight into its future impact.  
After discussing the relevant factors, the district court stated mark 
similarity factor was an “obviously important factor[].”212  In 
reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the presence of 
similarity in the dilution by blurring definition.213  Furthermore, 
the “ultimate” question, according to the district court, was 
“whether there is an association, arising from the similarity of the 
relevant marks, that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous 
mark.”214 
However, before answering this question, the district court 
indicated it would be “mindful of the purposes and core principles 
 
 208 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 107 n.3, 108 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
 209 Id. at 108. 
 210 See id. (“[W]ere we to adhere to a substantial similarity requirement for all dilution 
by blurring claims, the significance of the remaining five factors would be materially 
diminished.”); see also Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 U.P.S.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1645, 1667 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (interpreting Starbucks as requiring all factors to be treated equally). 
 211 Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 109 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)). 
 212 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212, 
1215–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 213 Id. at 1217.  The district court also found the actual association factor was an 
“obviously important factor” because the dilution by blurring definition indicates an 
association is required. Id. 
 214 Id. at 1216. (citing Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109). 
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of trademark law.”215  In particular, the district court focused on 
the idea that trademark law does not create a right in gross.216  
Then, focusing on inadequacies in the mark similarity and 
association factors, the court determined a likelihood of dilution by 
blurring was not present.217 
On its face, the district court’s analysis seems at odds with the 
Second Circuit’s proposed analysis.  Specifically, the district court 
seemed to indicate mark similarity was more important than other 
factors.218  In addition, the district court added to the Second 
Circuit’s proposed analysis by referring to trademark policies, 
which it indicated, justified carefully analyzing a claim of dilution 
by blurring.219  The district court’s decision creates uncertainty in 
the Second Circuit regarding the appropriate role of similarity in 
relation to the other factors. 
b)  The Ninth Circuit 
As discussed above, in Levi Strauss & Co., the Ninth Circuit 
held its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard was not applicable to 
the TDRA.220  Then, turning to the role of mark similarity, the 
court stated: “similarity has a special role to play in the 
implementation of the [TDRA’s] multifactor approach.”221  The 
court reached this result because similarity is singled out in the 
dilution by blurring definition and is “the first factor listed in the 
multifactor approach.”222  However, the court continued by 
recognizing that similarity should not “be the necessarily 
controlling factor.”  The court instructed the relevant factors 
should be considered to determine whether dilution by blurring is 
likely.223 
 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id.   
 217 Id. at 1217. 
 218 See id. 
 219 See id. 
 220 See supra Part II.A.1.b. 
 221 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 222 Id. at 1171–72. 
 223 See id. at 1173 (“[W]e took the degree of similarity into account with the other . . . 
factors in determining whether dilution [by blurring] was likely to occur.”). 
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Regardless, the court also found the factors “are not necessarily 
entitled to the same weight.”224  In particular, “[a] sufficiently 
strong showing of similarity can overcome all other relevant 
factors.”225  This language indicates the Ninth Circuit will allow a 
wealth of mark similarity to be dispositive.226  The Ninth Circuit 
also asserted, “[a]lthough we hold that a particular degree of 
similarity is not a threshold, similarity is a necessary predicate for 
the dilution by blurring analysis.”227  While this language has not 
been subsequently interpreted, it seems to show the Ninth Circuit 
will not allow a lack of similarity to be dispositive.228 
2. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Vastly Different 
Approach 
Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board initially held 
its pre-TDRA mark similarity standards survived the passage of 
the TDRA,229 the Board later joined the Second and Ninth Circuits 
in holding pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were no longer 
applicable.230  Unlike the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Board 
employs a vastly different approach concerning the proper role of 
mark similarity in the blurring analysis.  In particular, the Board 
judges mark similarity by a standard that requires less similarity 
than pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.231  The Board’s mark 
similarity standard asks “whether the two involved marks are 
sufficiently similar to trigger consumers to conjure up a famous 
mark when confronted with the second mark.”232 
The Board further detailed different enunciations of the 
standard.  Explaining the standard, the Board has indicated the 
 
 224 Id. at 1173 n.11. 
 225 Id. (citing Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 226 See id. at 1173 n.11. 
 227 Id. at 1173 n.12. 
 228 See id. 
 229 See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645, 
1666–67 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 230 See Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1028–30 (T.T.A.B. 2011). 
 231 See id. at 1129; Research in Motion Ltd. v. Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc., 
2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *35 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2012). 
 232 Research in Motion, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *35. 
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marks do not need to be “substantially identical.”233  Rather, “it is 
sufficient that the [marks] be highly similar.”234  The Board has 
also enunciated the standard in different ways.  For instance, the 
Board has asked whether “a substantial percentage of consumers” 
are “immediately reminded of the famous mark” by the junior 
mark and associate the two marks.235  The Board’s explanation of 
the standard and its alternate formulations of the standard give 
insight into the meaning of its new, lower mark similarity standard. 
Another source of insight into the standard’s meaning is its 
application.  The Board has applied its new mark similarity 
standard to several pairs of marks.  Specifically, the Board found 
“Crackberry” and “Blackberry,”236 “Motown” and “Motown 
Metal,”237 “Just Do It” and “Just Jesu It,”238 and “The Other White 
Meat” and “The Other Red Meat”239 met the standard.  Conversely, 
the Board found the marks “Rolex” and “Roll-X” did not meet the 
standard.240  Although application of the standard provides insight 
into its meaning, it is difficult to distinguish between the marks 
that did and the marks that did not meet the standard. 
It is also unclear whether the Board’s mark similarity standard 
is a threshold requirement in the dilution analysis.  The Board has 
repeatedly described its standard as a prerequisite to a finding of 
likelihood of dilution by blurring.241  The Board also previously 
indicated lack of similarity could be potentially dispositive.242  
 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1868, 1888 (T.T.A.B. 
2011); see also Nike, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028–30. 
 236 Research in Motion, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *36. 
 237 UMG Recordings, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888. 
 238 Nike, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028–30. 
 239 Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479, 
1497 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
 240 Rolex Watch U.S.A. Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188, 
1194–95 (T.T.A.B. 2011). 
 241 See, e.g., Research in Motion, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *35 (discussing “sufficient 
similarity” standard requires marks to be highly similar). 
 242 See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc. 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645, 1667 
(T.T.A.B. 2010) aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  To reach this 
conclusion, the Board applied the Federal Circuit’s reasoning that, in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis from traditional trademark infringement, “in a particular case even a 
single [likelihood of confusion] factor may be dispositive.” Id.  Consequently, the Board 
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Conversely, in the only case where the standard was not satisfied, 
the Board continued to analyze the remaining factors and, instead 
of relying only on the lack of similarity, determined that, on the 
balance, the factors justified finding there was no likelihood of 
dilution by blurring.243  Accordingly, while it appears the Board 
treats similarity as a potentially dispositive factor, the precise role 
of similarity—whether as a threshold element or especially 
important factor—is unclear. 
III.  THE PROPER EVOLUTIONARY COURSE: WHY PRE-TDRA MARK 
SIMILARITY STANDARDS SHOULD BE DISCARDED AND THE 
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD’S APPROACH TO 
ANALYZING MARK SIMILARITY SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
We here analyze the conflict regarding whether pre-TDRA 
mark similarity should continue to be used under the TDRA and, if 
not, what the proper role of mark similarity is in their absence.  We 
begin by demonstrating why pre-TDRA mark similarity standards 
are no longer employable under the TDRA.  We then show why 
courts should adopt the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s 
approach to mark similarity in their stead. 
A. Why Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Should Be 
Discarded 
The Second and Ninth Circuits correctly determined that the 
text of the TDRA unambiguously compelled elimination of pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards.  And even if the TDRA does not 
unambiguously compel elimination of pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards, the text of the TDRA does not support the continued use 
of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  Pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards should not be read into the TDRA because 
these standards were improperly justified at their adoption and 
extrinsic evidence is, at best, conflicting and problematic.  Instead, 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, which were hostile 
 
rejected the Second Circuit’s requirement that each factor be given the same weight in the 
dilution by blurring analysis. See id. 
 243 Rolex Watch, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1195–97. 
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interpretations of the prior law, should be left behind as dilution 
continues to evolve. 
1. The Plain Language of the TDRA Does Not Support Pre-
TDRA Mark Similarity Standards 
The Second and Ninth Circuit correctly determined the text of 
the TDRA prohibits the continued application of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards.  In fact, the text of the TDRA only refers to 
“similarity” and “degree of similarity.”244  Notably absent is any 
reference to “substantial similarity” or “identity.”245  Furthermore, 
although Professors Thomas J. McCarthy and Anne Gilson 
LaLonde have urged courts to continue employing pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards, these same scholars admit that the text 
of the TDRA does not require use of pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards.246  Accordingly, there is no mention of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards in the TDRA and, as a result, the plain 
language of the TDRA does not allow for their continued use. 
Even if the text of the TDRA does not unambiguously require 
courts to cease using pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards are not justifiable by the text of 
the TDRA.  Instead, the TDRA is completely silent regarding the 
continued use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.247  Whether 
a court determines that the plain language of the TDRA requires 
abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards or the TDRA is 
merely silent on the matter, the text of the TDRA does not support 
the use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. 
2. Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Should not Continue 
to Be Employed Because They Were Improperly Justified 
when Adopted Under the FTDA 
When initially adopted, pre-TDRA mark similarity standards 
were either unjustified extensions of state law or erroneously 
justified interpretations of federal law.  In many circuits, pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards were not justified by reference to 
 
 244 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
 245 See id. 
 246 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 183; 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(5)(c)(i). 
 247 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
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the statutory language.248  In these circuits, pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards can be traced to a single decision of the 
Second Circuit interpreting New York’s dissimilar dilution 
statute.249  Accordingly, in those circuits, pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards were unjustified extensions of state law. 
In other circuits, pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were 
erroneously justified by reference to the text of the FTDA.  Most 
notably, the Ninth Circuit erroneously interpreted the following 
language to justify its pre-TDRA mark similarity standards: “The 
owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction 
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or 
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous 
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”250  The 
Ninth Circuit determined placement of the definite article proved 
use of an identical mark was required.251 
However, the language does not lend itself to this 
interpretation.  Instead, the definite article signifies that the mark 
that has become famous must be the plaintiff’s mark and not some 
other mark.  This reading is bolstered by the changes made by 
Congress in the TDRA.  In particular, the TDRA now reads: 
“[T]he owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an 
injunction against another person who, at any time after the 
owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or 
trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution.”252  The 
emphasized language makes clear that the definite article is not 
used in conjunction with the junior mark.  Furthermore, this 
language has been correctly interpreted not to require the junior 
mark to be identical to the famous mark.253  Consequently, even in 
cases purporting to justify pre-TDRA mark similarity standards by 
the text of the TDRA, the standards were improperly justified.  
Courts should not read erroneously pre-TDRA mark similarity 
 
 248 See supra notes 79, 129–32, 159 and accompanying text. 
 249 See supra notes 129–32, 159 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra notes 160–164. 
 251 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 252 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 253 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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standards into the TDRA and, as a result, pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards should no longer be employed. 
3. Extrinsic Evidence Supports Interpreting the Text of the 
TDRA to Prohibit Use of Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity 
Standards 
Extrinsic evidence supports the elimination of pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards from the blurring analysis.  For one, since 
many different pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were 
employed under the prior law, continuing to employ these 
standards defeats Congress’s intent to provide uniformity in the 
application of federal dilution law.  Additionally, legislative 
history supports abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  
The legislative history is also sparse, problematic, and conflicted.  
At a minimum, it should not be used to read pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards into the TDRA.  Likewise, dilution as a theory 
of harm does not overcome the text of the TDRA because dilution 
is not reducible to a single theory and is still being defined.  
Alleged anti-competitive effects also do not overcome the text of 
the TDRA because they are unproven and improperly focus on 
hamstringing dilution through similarity when the TDRA is 
already crafted to limit the anti-competitive effects.  In the end, the 
text of the TDRA must be allowed to control because extrinsic 
evidence supports abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards and, regardless, potentially contradictory evidence is 
overstated and problematic. 
a)   Congress’s Intent to Remedy Inconsistent 
Interpretations of the Prior Federal Law Compels 
Elimination of Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards 
Allowing pre-TDRA mark similarity standards to be employed 
defeats Congress’s intent to remove inconsistent and hostile 
interpretations from federal dilution law.  Congress enacted the 
TDRA to remedy courts’ inconsistent and hostile interpretations of 
the prior federal statute.254  Under the prior federal law, many 
circuits applied their own widely different mark similarity 
 
 254 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 3 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1092. 
C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  4:49 PM 
2012] EVOLUTION OR MUTATION? 331 
standards.255  Congress did not expressly incorporate a pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standard.256  Consequently, reading pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards into the TDRA would defeat Congress’s 
intent to remove the inconsistent and hostile interpretations that 
plagued the prior federal law. 
b)   The Legislative History Supports Eliminating Pre-
TDRA Mark Similarity Standards 
The legislative history contains explicit support for abandoning 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  For instance, in discussing 
dilution by blurring and mark similarity, the legislative history 
contains the following language: “The less similar the marks, the 
less likely a consumer association between the marks; the more 
similar the marks, or if they are identical, the more likely it is that 
the junior mark will impair the association of the senior mark with 
its source and/or its particular brand attributes.”257  This language 
clearly supports eliminating pre-TDRA mark similarity standards 
because it indicates that while high mark similarity makes blurring 
more likely, it is not necessary.258  Accordingly, pre-TDRA mark 
similarity standards are inconsistent with legislative history and, as 
a result, should not be read into the text of the TDRA. 
Regardless, small businesses and trademark scholars rely on 
legislative history to overcome the text of the TDRA.259  However, 
ignoring the legislative history’s explicit support for eliminating 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, the legislative history is 
sparse and problematic.  Notably, the legislative history does not 
mention mark similarity standards.260  Accordingly, the legislative 
history is not particularly helpful.  And to resort to legislative 
history that “do[es] not squarely address the question presented” is 
 
 255 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
 256 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 257 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, then-President, 
International Trademark Association). 
 258 See supra notes 174–75and accompanying text. 
 259 Supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 260 See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1172 
n.10 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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“particularly inappropriate.”261  Accordingly, the text of the TDRA 
should control, and pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should 
not be inserted into the TDRA. 
In response, small businesses and trademark scholars point to 
comments in the legislative history indicating dilution “should be 
narrowly crafted . . . to protect only the most famous trademark 
from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or 
tarnish or disparage it.”262  They argue that the “subsequent uses” 
language shows Congress intended pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards to be part of the TDRA.263  However, this is an 
inappropriate interpretation because drawing the preceding 
inference from this language requires the assumption that the 
speaker was conveying information about mark similarity 
standards.  For this reason, it is important to recognize that 
clarifying and limiting which marks were famous enough to 
receive dilution protection was an important part of the TDRA.264  
In fact, after this comment the legislative history discussed the 
changes made through the TDRA including those with respect to 
fame.265  Accordingly, the comment’s emphasis on limiting fame 
by stating “only the most famous marks” deserve protection and 
the TDRA’s focus on limiting fame cast doubt on the proponents 
interpretation.  As a result, comments like this in the legislative 
history should not be read to support the continued use of pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards. 
Small businesses and trademark scholars ultimately rely on the 
legislative history’s silence to prove the TDRA was not intended to 
bar use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.266  However, “not 
every silence is pregnant.”267  And silence is not sufficient to 
overcome the text of the TDRA and the extrinsic evidence’s 
 
 261 Id. (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 262 E.g., Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 27, Levi Strauss & Co. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
109-23, at 25 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1093) (internal quotation 
marks and emphasis omitted). 
 263 See id. 
 264 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 5 (2005) reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1094. 
 265 See id. at 25. 
 266 See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 267 State of Ill., Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1983). 
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support for abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.  For 
these reasons, the text of the TDRA, which supports abandoning 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards,268 must be allowed to 
control. 
c)   Dilution Theory Does not Require Use of Pre-TDRA 
Mark Similarity Standards Because Dilution Has 
Evolved into Multiple Species 
Pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should be abandoned 
because arguments that dilution theory requires the use of pre-
TDRA mark similarity standards in the blurring analysis are 
flawed and overstated.  These arguments are flawed because they 
fail to take into account that dilution exists in several different 
forms and, as a result, generalizations about dilution are not 
persuasive.  For instance, state dilution law does not require a mark 
to be famous before dilution protection is granted.269  Additionally, 
Schechter’s initial articulation of dilution focused on protecting 
unique marks that added to the language.270  In contrast, federal 
dilution law requires a high level of fame and does not limit 
protection to unique marks.271  Interpretation of federal dilution 
law is impacted only by Congress’s conception of dilution as 
evidenced by the statutory language and legislative history. 
Arguments that dilution theory requires the use of pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards are also overstated for two reasons.  
First, the case law defining dilution theory was crafted over a 
period of time where courts were hostile to dilution and interpreted 
federal dilution law in ways to limit the new cause of action.272  
Second, courts and commentators have entertained a variety of 
theories to justify dilution protection.273  For these reasons, 
arguments about what dilution theory requires should not be given 
 
 268 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 269 2-5A LALONDE, supra 27, § 5A.02(1) (2011). 
 270 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 271 See supra Part I.C. 
 272 See supra Part I.B. 
 273 See generally Alexander Dworkowitz, Ending Dilution Doublespeak: Reviving the 
Concept of Economic Harm in the Dilution Action, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25, 31–42 
(2011) (discussing the different theories of dilution courts and commentators have relied 
on). 
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much weight.  Instead, the language of the TDRA should be the 
vehicle for defining Congress’s intended definition of dilution 
theory and pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should no longer 
be employed. 
d)   Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Are not 
Necessary to Protect Against Unproven Anti-
Competitive Effects 
Arguments that the anti-competitive effects of failing to 
employ pre-TDRA mark similarity standards require their use 
improperly focus on pre-TDRA mark similarity standards as the 
proper solution to an unproven problem.  On the one hand, 
although commentators may be correct that eliminating pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards may turn “Federal Express” into a 
prohibition against use of similar marks, they fail to show any 
harm caused by this result.274  All that would occur is that a new 
business would have to pick a different name, of which the 
possibilities are limitless.  Accordingly, the protection of famous 
marks against potentially harmful uses should not be curtailed by 
an unproven and harmless concern. 
Additionally, these arguments improperly focus on similarity 
as the proper solution.  For instance, in creative industries where 
the marks are in direct competition, it is argued that abandoning 
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards will allow for stifling of 
creativity because famous marks will own the creative work 
product of the industry.275  However, the TDRA already limits the 
extent of dilution protection in these areas by recognizing the 
extent of exclusive use of the mark as part of the blurring 
analysis.276  Accordingly, dilution by blurring analysis already 
provides a method for dealing with this concern and, therefore, this 
concern does not require use of pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards. 
Concern that dilution protection in the absence of pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards will run afoul of the general presumption 
 
 274 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 275 See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text. 
 276 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). 
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against trademark rights in gross are similarly misplaced.  To 
enumerate, the general presumption against trademark rights 
precludes protection in instances where the right to protection does 
not grow out of the use of the mark.277  Under the TDRA, dilution 
by blurring protects those famous marks that have so pervaded the 
marketplace that they transcend traditional commercial boundaries, 
having become household names.278  Accordingly, this protection 
does grow out of use of the mark and is not simply a property 
right.  Furthermore, even if this were not the case, Congress clearly 
has the power to make laws allowing for trademark rights in gross 
to be granted.279  Consequently, the general presumption against 
trademark rights in gross should not be used to cripple a valid act 
of Congress. 
B. Why Courts Should Use the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board’s Approach to Mark Similarity 
As demonstrated in Part III.A, pre-TDRA mark similarity 
standards are no longer appropriately employed in the dilution by 
blurring analysis.  However, this does not answer the question of 
what role mark similarity should have under the TDRA.  Here I 
argue that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s standard 
should be used to judge mark similarity because it is closely 
tailored to the text of the TDRA.  Although the Board is unclear as 
to the dispositive nature of its mark similarity standard, we show 
why its mark similarity standard should be regarded as a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for a finding of likely dilution by 
blurring.  I also explain the Board’s mark similarity standard 
should be used because, for practical reasons, it is necessary and 
appropriate. 
1. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Treatment of 
Mark Similarity Is Justified by the Plain Language of the 
TDRA 
The Board’s mark similarity standard is appropriately 
employed under the TDRA because the plain language of the 
 
 277 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 278 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 279 See United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918). 
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TDRA requires its use.  Parsing the language of the TDRA leads to 
a two-step analysis for determining whether a likelihood of 
dilution by blurring exists.280  First, there must be an “association 
arising from the similarity.”281  Second, this “association” must 
“impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”282  The Board’s 
mark similarity standard, which asks, “whether the two involved 
marks are sufficiently similar to trigger consumers to conjure up a 
famous mark when confronted with the second mark,”283 closely 
parallels the first step of the two-step analysis.  Accordingly, the 
plain language of the TDRA requires the Board’s mark similarity 
standard. 
The list of relevant factors and the “degree of similarity” 
standard do not overcome this interpretation of the dilution by 
blurring definition.  Statutory provisions are interpreted so as not 
to contradict or render meaningless other provisions.284  This 
principle is strengthened in this case because the relevant factors, 
including “degree of similarity,” are intended to aid courts in 
applying the dilution by blurring definition.  For these two reasons, 
the relevant factors, including “degree of similarity,” should not be 
interpreted to contradict the blurring definition.  Instead, “degree 
of similarity” should be interpreted to indicate that once the 
standard shows that the requisite association exists, the “degree of 
similarity” will impact the analysis of whether the association 
“impairs the distinctiveness” of the famous mark.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the dictionary definition of 
“degree” as a “measure”—and it does not preclude a floor or 
 
 280 Cf. Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir. 
2012) (ìTo state a dilution claim under the TDRA, [a plaintiff] must show . . . (iii) that the 
similarity [between the marks] gives rise to an association between the marks; and (iv) 
that the association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the [famous mark] . . . .î) 
(citing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264–65 
(4th Cir. 2007)). 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479, 
1497 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
 284 See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (“Our 
cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render 
superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.”). 
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ceiling on those values.285  Consequently, the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board’s standard is justified by the text of the TDRA. 
2. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Mark Similarity 
Standard Should Be Treated as a Necessary, but Not 
Sufficient Condition 
Analyzing the plain language of the TDRA shows the new, 
lower mark similarity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for a finding of likely dilution by blurring.  To demonstrate, 
although “association arising from the similarity” is clearly a pre-
requisite for a finding of dilution by blurring, the ultimate question 
is whether this association “impair[s] the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark.”286  Consequently, failing to meet the Board’s mark 
similarity standard means no likelihood of dilution can exist.  On 
the other hand, meeting the Board’s mark similarity standard 
should not be regarded as dispositive because the association must 
also “impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”287  Therefore, 
according to the plain language of the TDRA, the new mark 
similarity standard is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a 
finding of likely dilution by blurring. 
Interpreting the TDRA to allow similarity to be dispositive is 
supported because similarity is allowed to be dispositive in 
traditional infringement actions where similarity does not have the 
same importance.  In the likelihood of confusion context, similarity 
can be dispositive depending on the facts of the case.288  Although 
likelihood of dilution and likelihood of confusion are not the same, 
many courts’ dilution analyses are informed by their vast 
experience with confusion.289  Allowing similarity to be treated in 
this manner is more appropriate in the blurring context because of 
its stronger emphasis in the definition on blurring.290  Accordingly, 
the treatment of similarity in the likelihood of confusion context 
 
 285 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 304 (10th ed. 1997). 
 286 See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 288 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 289 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 290 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
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supports treating the new mark similarity standard as a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition in the blurring analysis. 
3. Practical Considerations Support Employing the New Mark 
Similarity Standard 
The Board’s new mark similarity standard should be employed 
because practical considerations make it a necessary and 
appropriate element of the blurring analysis.  Chiefly, requiring 
courts to use the mark similarity standard focuses the court’s 
analysis of similarity on what is required by the blurring definition.  
In contrast, failing to employ the mark similarity standard means 
courts will analyze similarity in a vacuum.  This consideration is 
important because it is more likely that courts will use mark 
similarity appropriately when they are guided in their analysis. 
Additionally, the Board’s mark similarity standard is 
appropriate because there is little risk that employing the standard 
will keep valid claims from being heard by a court.  To explain, the 
mark similarity standard focuses on consumer association, a pre-
requisite to likely dilution by blurring.  The standard does not ask 
the ultimate question of whether this association is significant 
enough to “impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”  
Rather, the standard is a significantly lower burden than the 
ultimate determination.  As a result, from a practical perspective, 
employing the Board’s new mark similarity standard is appropriate 
because there is little downside. 
On the other hand, employing the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board’s mark similarity standard protects, in a minimally 
restrictive way, against the anti-competitive effects of excessive 
dilution by blurring litigation.  For instance, if the owner of a 
famous mark brings a dilution by blurring claim against a small 
business, the standard provides the other company with the ability 
to quickly defeat frivolous dilution by blurring claims without 
bearing the expense of a whole trial.  This standard also allows 
frivolous claims of dilution by blurring to be dismissed on 
inexpensive grounds because comparing similarity requires little 
expense.  But, addressing all of the relevant factors, which includes 
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survey evidence, would be very expensive.291  Accordingly, using 
the Board’s mark similarity standard prevents dilution by blurring 
claims from being used as anti-competitive weapons without 
restricting valid claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the TDRA in response to hostile judicial 
interpretation of pre-TDRA federal dilution law.  The TDRA 
should not be interpreted to include improperly justified pre-TDRA 
mark similarity standards without an express indication of 
Congress’s desire to adopt them.  The TDRA is silent on the issue 
of whether these pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were 
adopted and extrinsic evidence of Congress’s intent is unclear at 
best.  Therefore, pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should not 
be read into the TDRA.  Instead, the TDRA should be interpreted 
based on the language therein to allow for the use of the new, 
lower mark similarity standards employed by the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board.  This standard, which closely tracks the 
language of the TDRA, is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for a finding of likelihood of dilution by blurring.  Deciding 
otherwise will stunt the evolution of federal dilution law by 
abandoning the text of the TDRA in favor of previous hostile 
interpretations. 
 
 291 See, e.g., David M. Kelly, Comment, Trademarks: Protection of Merchandising 
Properties in Professional Sports, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 927, 961 (1984) (noting that survey 
evidence is very expensive and that in the 1980s one survey cost in excess of one-half 
million dollars). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A – Levi Strauss & Co.’s Arcuate Mark 
 
 
Figure B – Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.’s “Ruehl” mark 
 
